This paper is the first which provides evidence for rent-sharing in Belgium using firm level data. It uses a panel of annual firm level data and shows that a rise in the firm's profitability leads after some years to an increase in worker's income. The profit-perhead elasticity of wages is about 0.1 and Lester's range of wages is estimated at approximately 60 percent of the mean wage.
I. Introduction
Most models of the labour market assume wages not simply being determined by supply and demand of labour, but rather by some endogenous process of wage determination such as wage bargaining or efficiency wage payments. Hence, a natural unemployment rate is explained through the interaction of the wage and a price setting curve (as in Layard et al. [1991] ). Since the seminal work by Blanchflower & Oswald [1994] , the micro economic fundamentals of wage curves have been the focus of much recent research in labour economics. This paper contributes to a further understanding of the micro economic foundations of wage determination in Belgium.
While wage curves using household survey data have been estimated for Belgium 1 ,
suggesting wage setting is consistent with endogenous models of wage determination, there is no direct evidence on how important rent-sharing is between workers and firms. Therefore this paper addresses the following questions: (i) Is there evidence of persistent rent-sharing in the Belgian economy, which is consistent with noncompetitive models of wage determination? (ii) How important is rent-sharing in terms of the elasticity of pay with respect to profitability, (iii) Can rent-sharing explain observed wage inequality in Belgium?
Rent-sharing assumes that the firm's ability to pay explains its wage payments. There may be various reasons to find a positive causality with firm profitability determining the level of pay. 2 First, the presence of uncertainty may lead to an observed positive correlation between wages and profitability, assuming some persistency in profits and wages. Typically, these models draw from optimal contract theories. 3 A second reason why rent-sharing might occur are insider forces that cause externalities on the labour 1 See Janssens & Konings [1998] . 2 Note that rent-sharing does not include efficiency wage considerations since the latter assumes wage payments to determine firm-profitability. However, this reversed causality with respect to rent-sharing will necessitate finding instruments for profits in any partial regression analysis. 3 A theoretical framework in which both workers and the firm are assumed to be risk-averse is given by Blanchflower, Oswald & Sanfey [1996] .
market. 4 If they exist, insider forces are supposed to have significant bargaining power over the worker's wages. Insiders simply demand part of the rents made by the firm. Unionization can lead to insider forces however its presence is not a necessary condition. A final reason why wages may be positively correlated with profits is that firms face product demand shocks and, at the same time, a strictly upward sloping labour supply curve exists. Intuitively, the upward sloping labour supply curve could be the result of temporary frictions causing a positive short-run correlation between wages and profits. 5 Contrary to the two foregoing arguments, the latter is consistent within a competitive labour market framework however only in the short-run.
If there is bargaining over wages, there is also scope for rent-sharing. Therefore empirically, rent-sharing often refers to insider forces only. The dependence of wages on establishment prosperity is related to the degree of decentralisation in the wage setting procedure. Theoretically, complete centralisation as an institution leaves no scope for independent wage adjustments at the firm level while controlling for worker's skills or working conditions. In practice however, centralised agreements can be thought of as wage norms from which the firm might deviate but which can be costly. 6 Typically, Northern European countries are characterised by relative centralised bargaining while the US labour market exhibits relative decentralisation. This paper is the first to investigate the issue of rent-sharing in the Belgian economy using a unique panel data set of firm level data combined with sector information. In the remainder, this paper will first provide a theoretical model and a model in terms of observables. Section III covers a description of the data and gives some summary statistics. Section IV discusses the estimation methodology and reports the results.
Section V returns to theoretical insights and gives a discussion of the obtained results.
Finally the paper concludes.
II. Theoretical Background
Focussing on the impact of profit-per-employee on wages, two models of rent-sharing through collective bargaining are commonplace. The first only assumes collective bargaining about wages at the first stage where after the firm sets employment given the wage in the second stage as, for example, in Blanchflower, Oswald & Sanfey [1996] . By contrast, Abowd & Lemieux [1993] model the case where there is bargaining about wages and employment. Despite the fact that both models produce the same wage equations, they are fundamentally different in that in the right-tomanage model employment is highly endogenous with regard to wages whereas in an 8 For a discussion, see Nickell [1999] .
efficient contract bargaining framework employment does not directly depend on the bargained wage. 9 However, both bring forward the hypothesis of wages being driven by the firm's good fortune.
Consider as the basic framework a model of decentralised wage setting at the firm level. 10 In particular, assume only wages are set through negotiations between the firm and the insiders present in that firm. Then, it can be shown that the equilibrium wage is determined by the outside wage available in the event of a bargaining dispute, 0 w , the probability of becoming unemployed, U, the relative bargaining strength of the insiders, Φ and the level of profit-per-employee, n Π .
The corresponding statistical specification that acts as the bedrock for the regressions in this paper is given by Note however that unobserved compensating differentials could still exist and therefore affect the estimates. An unobserved shifter control at the individual level is
given by ijt ε .
The sign of 1 β is expected to be negative since sector unemployment rates signal labour market tightness to the insiders. High sector unemployment rates inform the workers about the low probability of finding another employer in the same sector.
Therefore wage claims will be moderated. Note that the above bargaining framework is a sufficient however not a necessary conditions for finding a negative relationship 9 For a discussion, see Booth [1990] . 10 See Blanchflower, Oswald & Sanfey [1996] .
between real wages and sector unemployment. In particular, a negative coefficient 1 β could also be predicted from an efficiency wage framework. Since high sector unemployment rates imply low probabilities of finding alternative jobs, firms can lower wage payments while maintaining a motivated workforce. Although the hypothesis of efficiency wage payments is fundamentally different from rent-sharing considerations, it is straightforward that its presence can influence the estimations.
According to the same line of reasoning, the bargaining framework predicts a positive coefficient of 2 β . Both, 1 β and 2 β measure the outside forces in the bargaining framework. Inside forces are proxied by the impact of rents-per-employee on real firm-level wages where 3 β is expected to be positive. Testing the above rent-sharing framework requires controlling for worker's skills and working conditions. Therefore equation (6) explicitly includes the ratio of white over bleu collar workers and can include in practice sector, regional and time dummies.
The remainder of this paper is an attempt to confront the different theoretical hypotheses with Belgian firm level data. It tests the standard competitive model predicting that no relationship can exist between wages and the firm's ability-to-pay in the long run.
III. Description of the Data
The analysis draws partially upon a random draw from company account's data To control for outside forces, sector unemployment rates were deducted from the monthly bulletin of labour statistics, published by the RVA (Rijksdienst Voor Arbeidsbemiddeling). Consumer price indexes were drawn from the BELGOSTAT data source of the NBB as to obtain real values for wages and profits. 
IV. Estimation and Results
This paper examines three types of equations. First, microeconometric earnings functions are calculated to provide an estimation benchmark. It is straightforward however that profits-per-employee are endogenous. If shocks to profits take time to be passed on in greater remuneration, it might be possible to consider the equation structure as recursive. The appropriate structure for estimation would then be to regress wages on lagged values of profits. Third, an instrumental variable estimation is obtained by a two-stage least squares procedure. Table 2 is an estimation of the loglinear form of equation (6) . The estimated equation includes a dummy variable for each year to control for economy wide movements from 1987 to 1994. Column (2) introduces one-digit industry dummies to control for industry fixed effects. The human capital ratio holds guard against the possibility that wages are higher merely because the firm employs people with high levels of human capital. in profitability between firms contributes substantially to the observed wage inequality in Belgium. Note also that the obtained estimate is close to the evidence of rent-sharing in the studies outlined in the previous section.
Outside forces seem to be important in wage determination. If sector dummies are included, an increase in the average sector wage by 10% rises the equilibrium wage as the outcome of the bargaining process by about 9%. As could be expected, the sectorunemployment rate is negatively related to wages but only significant if industry dummies are not allowed to have any explanatory power.
Moulton [1986] and others have pointed out that t-statistics can be artificially large using these kinds of micro equations. Combining a dependent variable that has about 13 000 observed values with an independent variable that has only approximately seventy different observations causes the difficulty. 11 In general two ways can be taken to avoid the statistical pitfall. First, the data can be compressed into cell means Table 3 . With regard to firm level information, the results are similar to those of Table 2 . Using Lester's methodology, profits now explain approximately 34% of the deviation from the mean wage. However, the estimates for the coefficient of the sector unemployment and average-sector-wage elasticity of earnings seem not to be robust although the elasticities show the expected sign in both Table 2 and Table   3 . Using the two-stage procedure, the evidence suggests industry unemployment to have a significant negative impact on wages. Compared to the benchmark OLS estimator, sector-average wages have a less strong impact on wage setting.
Nevertheless, the estimated elasticity remains significant. To conclude, Table 3 confirms the existence of some causal relationship between profits-per-head and wage payments for firms in Belgium.
The estimates in Tables 2 and 3 are only a first pass at the problem. As outlined before, profits are endogenous. Therefore, in estimating a function where the equilibrium wage is determined by the level of profit-per-employee, it is necessary to bear in mind the simultaneity between profitability and pay. In general, there are two ways to handle the problem. First, if shocks to profits only affect wages after some time, the long-run effect of profits on wages can more accurately being estimated by setting lagged profits instead of profits as independent variables. If a statistical relation between profits and pay can be found using lagged values of the firm's ability-to-pay, standard competitive theory does not provide any explanation for the observed rent-sharing. The second possible approach is to find a good instrumental variable. However, very often this route cannot be easily exploited. For example, demand shocks could proof to be helpful instruments if they are measured properly. This is because demand shocks are supposed to enter the earnings equation only through the profits-per-employee variable. However, it is difficult to find persuasive exogenous shocks that increase consumer prices in reality. 12 This paper uses both, the recursive equation and the instrumental variable approach (however with lagged profits as instruments) to examine rent-sharing in Belgium. The results of applying OLS to the recursive equation are captured in Table 4 .
Estimation uses the logarithm of average-firm wages as the dependent variable. The independent variables are the logarithms of the sector-average unemployment rate, the sector average wage rate, the employer's ability-to-pay per worker at time t-1, t-2, t-3 and a proxy for the level of human capital required by the firm. Time dummies control for overall economic changes during the period 1987 to 1994. If appropriate, sector dummies are included to control for sector fixed effects. The results in Table 4 are consistent with rent-sharing theory. Seemingly, increases in profits lead to higher levels of pay. Various specifications are set in columns (1) to (3) . The largest coefficient is found in column (3) where only the profit-per-employee in t-3 is included. The coefficient of 0.059 means that a doubling of firm profitability would, after some years, be associated with a rise in pay of approximately 6 percent.
Column (3) of Table 4 therefore contradicts the standard competitive framework. As it seems, profits only feed through into higher wages gradually which is inconsistent with a short-run point of view. So Table 4 shows again that the variability in profitability between firms contributes substantially to the observed wage inequality in Belgium.
Column (4) estimates the effect of sector unemployment on wage payments while controlling for human capital within the firm. This relationship is better known as a wage curve and the unemployment elasticity of wages is normally estimated around -0.1. 13 If bargaining between insiders and the firm is important, the sector unemployment rate reflects only part of the story. The effect of sector unemployment on pay is endogenous and the model can be respecified using the bargaining procedure as is done in columns (1) and (2). As follows from Table 4 , the unemployment elasticity of wages then diminishes to about -0.05. Table 5 switches to an alternative estimation method. From the analysis above, it is straightforward that lagged profits might be valuable instruments to solve for the least squares of the sample's first moment conditions. The instrumental variable estimations are obtained using a two-stage least squares procedure.
The principle results of this paper are presented in Table 5 . Columns (1) and (2) use the logarithm of profits-per-employee in t-1 and t-3 as instruments respectively.
Relative to the results in column (3) of Table 4 , the profit-per-employee elasticity of wages increases to 0.098. Coefficients for the other regressors, however, are similar to those obtained in the recursive equation except for that outside forces become separately statistically insignificant. So evidence for rent-sharing is even stronger using instrumental variable estimators. A doubling of the profits will feed through into wages, increasing the level of pay permanently with about 10%. Differences in profits between identical firms can explain about 60% of deviations from the mean wage. The evidence for rent-sharing is robust to the inclusion of different dummy variables.
First, sector fixed effects did not moderate the profit elasticity of wages. If certain sectors then can be labelled as unionised relative to others, union bargaining does not solely drive the paper's rent-sharing findings. It can be argued that besides unions, firm-characteristics play an important role in the wage-setting procedure. Relating insider's power to the size of the firm does not alter the findings of Table 5 . Insiders have power independent of the number of workers employed by the firm. Finally, controlling for regional differences, the profit elasticity of wages equalises the value in column (2) of Table 5 .
V. Checking Interpretations and Comparing Results
The results of Section 4 produce evidence for rent-sharing in a not-standard competitive framework. It provides profits-per-head elasticities of wages similar to those found in other studies quoted at the beginning of the text.
This might seem unsurprising, given that the results draw upon a dataset from a highly unionised country. This paper is the first to find evidence of rent-sharing for Belgium and one of the few that uses firm level data. Using Blanchflower's terminology, rentsharing can best be thought of in the context of a labour market externality where insiders act as external forces. Given the theoretical framework used throughout the paper, contract theory and efficiency wage payments are not explicitly captured.
Moreover, it can be argued that efficiency wages make it hard to understand the role of lagged profit values. Although the model therefore only considers the presence of insider power, interpreting some estimates one might overlook the importance of incentive mechanism design. Because efficiency wages are set in a principal-agent relationship, they cannot be observed explicitly in the model of Section II. But estimating the causal relationship between profits-per-head and wages using equation (6) does not exclude the effects of, say, efficiency wage payments neither.
Another important objection to the performed rent-sharing analysis is given by Reder [1980] . He argued that the true model is a competitive one, however with slow adjustments. If this is correct, evidence of rent-sharing is misleading. The relation between profits and pay is caused by a temporary move up the labour supply curve in booming industries. One way of testing the assumptions of partially adjustment is to incorporate into the regression a set of current and lagged employment variables. If the competitive framework with gradual adjustment is correct, the effects of rentsharing should destroy the statistical significance of the profit variable. When employment at t, t-1 and t-2 are included as regressors and the 2SLS estimator is applied, the profit terms are unaffected.
Another criticism could be to argue that the wage equation is a misspecified inverted labour demand curve. Using data from firm's accounting reports, only labour demand can be accurately estimated. With a Cobb-Douglas production function, for example, profit maximisation can generate a positive association between profits-per-head and pay. However, the significance of lagged profits back to t-3 is hard to match with the idea that the wage equation might be representing an inverted labour demand relationship.
In sum, it is not easy to see how the estimates of Table 4 and 5 of Section IV could be compatible with the standard competitive labour market framework. Although temporary frictions could induce a short-run positive relationship between profits and wages, this seems to be overruled by the finding here of a steady-state effect. So another route is to argue that insiders play an important role at the firm level.
Employers and employees bargain over profits that might lead to the results stated above.
From a policy point of view it is important to recognise that wages are determined in an endogenous way and not simply through the interaction of supply and demand. A number of policy implications could be derived. First, related to the debate about minimum wages, based on the results here it is likely that minimum wages play a minor role in wage determination and hence in explaining unemployment due to the fact that the wage is correlated with firm profits. Therefore, reducing minimum wages is unlikely to going to have an effect on (un)employment.
Second, the results suggest that firm-profitability is an important factor in explaining wages and wage inequality. Thus, product market spillovers to the labour market are likely to be important. This suggests that a flexible product market may be important to enhance flexibility in the labour market. This is a theme for further research, but is often ignored in formulating policy implications. Questions which come to mind are related to the relationship between competitiveness in the product market and unemployment. In particular, if product markets are not competitive it is likely that wages will be higher and therefore unemployment will be higher. It is therefore important that anti-trust authorities monitor firm behaviour in the product market.
VI. Conclusions
Wages and profits can provide a positive relationship for several reasons. Within the standard competitive framework, an increase in profits induces a shift up the labour supply curve and hence a rise in wage payments. However, in the long run, the labour supply curve is supposed to be perfectly elastic. This paper shows that worker's remuneration follows earlier movements in profitability and therefore the standard competitive analysis does not capture the findings here. Different ways to save the competitive analysis framework were tested and seemed insufficient to explain the profit-wage relationship. As a steady state fact, workers eventually receive some of the gains made by the firm. This is the central prediction of not-standard competitive theories in which rents are divided between firms and employees. According to one theory, insiders and employers may bargain over profits. Here, insider forces that cause externalities on the labour market imply rent-sharing. Using the most elegant and simple bargaining framework, evidence suggests changes in the firm's profitability to have an effect upon pay. The elasticity of wages with respect to profitper-employee is 0.1. Lester's range of pay is then approximately 60% of the mean wage.
